Widespread misinformation persists about the relative merits of various alternative voting methods, with regard to tactical voting. We now discuss a few of those methods.

### Instant Runoff Voting/Ranked Choice Voting

IRV is a ranked voting method. Proponents of IRV commonly claim that it is highly resistant to tactical behavior. Our extensive analysis finds quite the opposite. IRV fails the Favorite Betrayal Criterion, meaning it can punish voters for sincerely ranking their favorite candidate in first place. This incentivizes a type of exaggeration which causes it to degenerate approximately into ordinary Plurality Voting (aka First Past the Post). Moreover, naive voter exaggeration means that voters commonly utilize this strategy, without even being aware of the mathematical basis for it.

### Condorcet Methods

Contrary to common misconception, Condorcet methods are indeed susceptible to strategy. Here is some mathematical analysis from Warren Smith, which explores the susceptibility of various Condorcet methods to the burial strategy. One particularly concerning pathology is the DH3 scenario, in which naive exaggeration results in the election of a candidate considered worst by as many as 100% of voters.

### Score Voting & Approval Voting

Despite common intuition, Score Voting is extremely resistant to the effects of tactical voting. Unlike virtually all ordinal (“ranked”) voting methods, Score Voting satisfies the Favorite Betrayal Criterion, meaning voters can always safely give the maximum support to their sincere favorite candidates. The aforementioned Bayesian regret figures show that Score Voting outperforms all commonly proposed alternatives with any mixture of strategic or honest voters.

Moreover, two theorems attest to the relatively mild effect of tactical behavior under Score Voting:

Tactical Score Voting may be, in practice, more likely to elect a Condorcet winner (when one exists) than real Condorcet methods.

Score Voting maximizes the number of voters who are “pleasantly surprised” by the election outcome.